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Abstract. A theoretically motivated reasoning leaving its mark on legal dogmatics producing 
some derivative through a methodical process, the doctrinal study of law is a parasite 
contingent upon the law in force. For it converts law positedly built by consecutive structuring 
of words into some sort of a uniform conceptual system. Therefore it is an authored product 
mostly in a historical chain. Its novelty is lending logicality to what is inadvertent itself. As a 
reconstruction providing logically added meaning to a subject not carrying this itself, it too is 
contingent with by chance variations competing amongst themselves. Its goal is to establish 
consequentiality for deductive derivations in order to guarantee certainty in/of the law. 
Consequently, in arrangements without conceptualization there is no dogmatics either. In 
European history, the continental tradition has retraced ius to lex for the law to be embodied by 
posited texts. Dogmatics is a meta-structure logified upon them. 
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1. Legal Dogmatics in a Science-theoretical Perspective 
 
The doctrinal study of law is not a scientific field on its own–is not a discipline 
in either academic sense–, rather it is a pursuit, and the product thereof as its 
formulation.  
 One can hardly find a more exacting proclamation of the various possible 
manifestations of law than that given of the variety of the “languages of law” 
more than half a century ago by the father of our friend Jerzy Wróblewski (who 
passed on fifteen years ago), who–similarly to his son–was also a professor of 
law. According to this1 there is, on the one hand, the law, and on the other hand, 
the application of law, and in between them one finds the doctrinal study of 
law and jurisprudence, with their respective languages. In other words, we 
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have the law in books, the stuff of desiderata with normativity derived from its 
valid positivation, and we have also the law in action composed of series of 
deductions based on the former in form of actual decisions to convert positive 
rules into practical reality, within the social understanding of the law’s final 
ordering force in society. Or, the latter as the fulfilment of an expectation is 
therefore also reality while it keeps on to represent a kind of normativity as 
well, able to exert normative effects indirectly. Within the domain of law, 
logically speaking there is nothing other between and above these than mere 
words (speech-acts) used to represent and operate them in a discourse treating 
and processing them, which forms a meta-system by reformulating them at a 
higher systemic level. In fact, the very goal of carrying this discourse is exactly 
this meta-system: to discover and to construct–within a dogmatic approach–
contents believed to be hidden behind the authoritatively manifested nominal 
forms of the law; contents which can be construed as organized into a coherent 
system by the tools of linguistic-logical analysis. Or, the goal of such a focus on 
building some scientific re-representation is to identify “essential” correlations 
in the law’s verbal manifestation of authority, from its phenomenal expression 
taken as an empirically experiencable (and therefore scientifically reconstruable) 
aggregate of facts. 
 It is important to realize that the law and its application are here understood 
to be two distinct components that either complement or compete with one 
another, albeit to study the law without simultaneously studying its application 
could at best be relevant as a within itself contrasted partial analytical investiga-
tion covering only particular issues (e.g. in order to analyze the applied law 
from the perspective of criteria native to positive law, or in order to allow for 
the formulation of dogmatics built exclusively on the positive law). Apart from 
that, in every other case the two need to be investigated as parts of one single 
and integrated unit, since the parallel existence of two separate dogmatics–that 
of written law & that of jurisprudence–would at the least be simply without 
reason. 
 Accordingly, the doctrinal study of law cannot be a scientific field on its 
own. It too is, instead, practical action itself. It is a part, extension, completion, 
and augmentation of the praxis which, almost singularly in the world, treats–
artificially–whatever given textual form of the law as the embodiment of the 
law itself, by inducing whatever legal [ius] from the posited texture of the law 
[lex], thereby treating the latter as the starting point of all departures and 
theoretical developments, i.e. all reflexive intellectual exercise in law. When 
students of law, aware of the fallible nature of any textual form, are setting off 
to produce linguistic-logical projections on (while the systemic reinterpretation 
of) such texts–and by doing so they inevitably also carry out a critical analysis 
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thereof, increase the rigorousness of the in-built presuppositions, resolve latent 
contradictions, fill in the obvious gaps, and decode the meaning of (or, properly 
speaking, gives professional meaning to) their terms and concepts along the 
line of a uniform logic, and then produce a coherent logical system based on 
and as an ultimate result of all of these–, they play a role in the development 
of law, in its timely completion. When doing so, the scholar does work that 
naturally could in fact have been done by those having drafted the law (since 
the desire for and expectation of just such a finalization could already be 
detected as early as in the compilation of 15th century European customary 
law, similarly to other compilations akin to Werbőczy’s Tripartitum,2 in order 
to then–starting with the large codification work dated to the French Code 
civil–eventually reach its perfect form hardly surpassed to this day); all of this, 
however, did not and can in fact not render unnecessary the subsequent 
integration of the refining feedback (repeatedly, as conditions and practices do 
change incessantly) by those demanding cultivators of theorized praxis who 
undertake this doctrinal system-building as authors. For it is to be remembered 
that not one single attempt at it is logically necessary but is alternative and 
concurrent, i.e. displaying a certain (practice-boundly theorized) optimum at the 
most. 
 Most of our large operational systems (our factories, bridges, hydroelectric 
power generating plants, similarly to our computer-based capacities) have once 
been designed by scientific talents, nevertheless, their related products are not 
the stuff of science, rather, at the most these are purely practical applications 
borne out of the marriage of science and certain results of various other forms 
of human understanding. So not even the doctrinal study of law does “cognitively 
recognize”, instead it gives a more sophisticated, linguistically-logically 
organized, thus higher-level form to a formal manifestation, which otherwise 
bears meaning just in and as bound to its given arbitrary appearance. Conse-
quently, no results of dogmatics can be verified or falsified. We must make our 
surroundings habitable, we must cleanse our things, and it is a sign of careful 
practice and good practicality as well if we organize our beads and buttons 
according to some principle. Furthermore, while we are busy at work we may 
come to gain some deep understanding; however with all of this–either at the 
time of the process itself or at a later revisiting of the issue–we do not advance 
the knowledge itself, instead we merely reduce the incidental nature or 
somewhat increase the utility of our things by our act of creating order via 
organization. 
  
 2 Cf. as an entry in <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Istv%C3%A1n_Werb%C5%91czy>, 
and Bak, J. M.–Banyó, P.–Rady, M. (eds.): The “Tripartitum”. Budapest, 2005. 473. 
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 Thus, the cultivation of legal dogmatics is a practical step in the direction 
of the positivism’s geometrical law-ideal, which goes past the mere positing of 
law, which in all of its attempted forms remains contingent. Occasionally, of 
course, it can be increasingly tight, but it cannot reach such a degree of 
correlation, equivalency and systemic coherence that would by its very nature 
exclude the possibility of other (re)constructions.3 
 As soon as this attempt at refining the system by way of internal clarification 
reaches a certain depth, it could in fact require further breaking-down which can 
either manifest itself at the level of the whole of the legal system, or distributed 
among the various branches of law. Nevertheless, we are well advised to 
remember that as soon as we elevate our attention from the level of a given 
branch of law (which is tied together by a singular set of professional specifica-
tions) to the level of the entire legal system (which is comprised of the units 
of the branches, and which is rather more randomized in nature), we are 
proportionally less likely to encounter the systemic self-discipline that could 
be characteristic of the lower levels, and as a result we are left with fewer and 
fewer items that would be (otherwise) required for the comprehensive and 
methodical development of a systemic conceptual re-construction of the law.4 
  
 3 For the immanent limits of axiomatism in law cf., by the author, ‘A kódex mint 
rendszer (A kódex rendszer-jellege és rendszerkénti felfogásának lehetetlensége)’ [Code as 
system (Its systemic nature and the unfeasibility of its understanding as a system)] Állam- 
és Jogtudomány XVI (1973) 268–299 and ‘Heuristic Value of the Axiomatic Model in 
Law’, forthcoming in Jakob, R.–Philipps, L.–Schweighofer, E.–Varga, Cs. (eds.): Rechts-
theorieband in memoriam Ilmar Tammelo. Münster, 2008. 
 4 We can only introduce this as a distant analogy: an attempt to repeat the axiomatic 
founding and deductibility-expectation, which was thought to have been achieved in 
individual branches of science (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.)–spellbound by the allure 
of “unified science”–, in hope of reaching a supposed final founding that would unify (by 
bringing to a common denominator) the paradigms of all the various branches of science, 
has already led to a disappointing failure, since human science itself in its fallible human 
manifestation has eventually proven to be contingent. 
 Similarly, it is theoretically possible to attempt to establish a final doctrinal assessment 
of the various stylistic ideals that may have characterized a certain art form in different 
historical periods, but to do so in a general sense, and in the broader context of perhaps 
differing styles, and even more so, with regard to different branches of art, seems like an 
unreasonable effort in the long run. 
 For their first classical syntheses, cf. Neurath, O. (ed.): International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science. Chicago, 1938. and Wölfflin, H.: Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Das 
Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst. München, 1915. 255, respectively. 
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2. The Process of Advancing Conceptualization 
 
Consequently, when we conceptualize available linguistic material–to be treated 
with semantics and logics–according to some legal systemicity, we are in fact 
creating some taxonomic locus/loci comprised of what is/are essentially 
random word/s, which is/are used for lack of a better way of communication. 
However, this way of forming taxonomic units itself is potentially in a constant 
change and flux, since the matter of what and where (at which level) will end 
up becoming a demarcating item (i.e. a taxonomic identifier) is contingent on–
among other things–a certain internal dynamic, and is dependent on a certain 
fluctuation; and the issue of what will function in quality of exactly what will 
have only been defined by the entire contexture of the system (e.g. the mere 
functionality of what can serve as rule or principle, or the way in which the same 
words used in different branches can indeed have differing meanings).5 Similarly, 
it is the whole system that is at potential stake as a result of conceptual division, 
classification, categorization, hierarchization, in result of mental operations. Yet, 
it is not the case that simply words turn into concepts6 and are then manipulated 
further within some logical chain; what is at the heart of the matter is rather that 
all these can serve as building blocks of and foundations for a meta-system, the 
properties of which will have been defined through their integration into this 
meta-system. Furthermore, it is such a meta-system which is the tighter the 
more contingent; hence, it could potentially be different (differently executed 
and construed) based on the same posited material underneath it. 
 It is certainly an overly simplified approach if we imagine a vision of 
bipolar existence, where on the one end there is the “stuff of language”–clothed 
in its given form at any given time–, and on the other end, legal dogmatics, 
as a sort of dressing up of the previous in the cloak of “legal taxonomy”. In 
reality, however, they can be pictured as flowing waves that are always 
  
 5 Cf., by the author: Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality, Relativity, and 
Interdependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context, Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 43 (2002) 219–232 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/r27863g 
6u01q777u/fulltext.pdf> as well as in La structure des systèmes juridiques [Collection 
des rapports, XVIe Congrès de l’Académie internationale de droit comparé, Brisbane 2002] 
dir. O. Moréteau & J. Vanderlinden. Bruxelles, 2003. 291–300. 
 6 This is what I have already attempted to show when stating that the concept of ‘rule’ 
is common to all arrangements in Western law, while the concept of ‘norm’ is specific only 
to the Continent. Cf., by the author: Rule and/or Norm, or the Conceptualisibility and 
Logifiability of Law. In: Schweighofer, E.–Liebwald, D.–Angeneder, S.–Menzel, T. (eds.): 
Effizienz von e-Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Stuttgart–München–Hannover et. al. 
2005. 58–65. 
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positioned at opposing phases of some sort of a ‘vision of existence’. As 
soon as we have “law”, its very first analytical understanding brings about the 
sprouting of some sort of “dogmatics”; and as soon as this understanding is 
transposed into the dogmatic realm, its very first practical application will in 
turn also contribute to having a richer legal quality. Consequently, whatever 
advancement is exhibited, the given law and its dogmatic counterpart prove 
to be mutually preconditioned. When making choices in the presence of 
alternatives, choosing according to preferences, siding with one of several 
differing (competing) conceptualizations, and opting for one technical procedure 
over another, it always increases the contingency of the given doctrinal variant; 
while, by the same token, the broader contexts of policy efforts directed at law 
or of social order-ideals manifested in law may also re-posit dogmatic arrange-
ments at a higher taxonomic place. 
 Nevertheless, this counteracting wave-like dynamic formed between the law 
and its dogmatics not only acts as a constantly relativising force, which makes 
law dependent on dogmatics and vice versa, but it also prevents the formation of 
such a static state, where there could be any reasonable discussion of systemic 
immutability, a fixed state of constancy, or even any ultimate linguistical-
logical equivalency. Therefore, we can only address the systemic nature of the 
actual state or its tightness, in which the major strands and sidetracks of the 
act of system-creation–regardless of whether we speak of logical or linguistic 
correlation (deduction or any act of connection: assignment or co-ordination)–
can, theoretically, be reconstituted by other components in a new order, as a 
result of any actual (formal or hermeneutical) change occurring at either the 
“top” or the “bottom” of the original operational chain. Regardless of what great 
strides Continental law (the rule-set of which is made normative also through 
its dogmatics while reestablished as a sphere of interrelated norms) has made 
toward distancing itself from the traditions of classic Roman law (which was 
developed further by way of the classic Anglo-Saxon law doctrine in its own 
manner), it is, nevertheless, subject to change with respect to its dogmatics, 
initiated by whatever new challenge, or newly manifested factor rising out of 
the application of law (or any force of theoretical nature having an effect on the 
application of law), and this change can lead to reorganization of the dogmatic 
structure of Continental law. Somewhat this is similar to how in Anglo-Saxon 
case-law the method of distinguishing can result in the reevaluation, or reinter-
pretation of the message that can be deciphered from any newly presented 
particular case, more precisely, the judge’s rendering of the law (“by declaring 
what the law is”) is always conditional on the case-specific evaluation of 
prior decisions, when the actual adjudicative assessment of facts may alter the 
message presented by precedents. 
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 Consequently, dogmatics, on the one hand (and as such, at the same time, 
we can state that dogmatics remains dogmatics so long as and because it) 
carries the promise of completeness, and on the other hand, is always transient 
in nature, because at any given time it is merely in the state of development. 
Dogmatics has an inalienable dual nature, regardless of the fact that we either 
deduce its existence from the notion that “we must make a decision that results 
in action, and in our decision-making we cannot rely on certainty”,7 or we 
ascribe it an allegedly completed systemic quality derived from its being (as it 
is) the exclusive form of the manifestation of law–one that therefore (for all 
intents and purposes) is an axiomatically established given, as it is simply posited 
that way–while being cognizant of the brutal fact that the same exclusive 
form through which the law has been normatively posited and thereby also 
materialized is arbitrary; and thus eventually we do recognize just in its 
random and fallible character a hypothetized systemic quality, which at the 
same time may require expounding, clarification, and the process of making it 
explicit.8 Regardless of whatever extent its structure is conceptually completed, 
in relation to meeting specific practical challenges it still manifests itself in 
casual answers; and this too do therefore mean that–similarly to English law–it 
  
 7 Szabó, M.: Ars Iuris A jogdogmatika alapjai [The foundations of legal dogmatics]. 
Miskolc, 2005. 18. 
 8 And this is the essence of the long debated Hungarian doctrine of the “invisible 
constitution” as well: it postulates an undefined dogmatics, as if it were something floating 
above the text of the posited constitution, and as such as something that the Constitutional 
Court relies on in its decision making, when it passes down rulings without sufficient 
normative basis (i.e. in absence of a specific constitutional rule). Cf., by the author, ‘Legal 
Renovation through Constitutional Judiciary?’ in Sadakata, M. (ed.): Hungary’s Legal 
Assistance Experiences in the Age of Globalization. Nagoya, 2006. 287–312 as well as 
‘Creeping Renovation of Law through Constitutional Judiciary?’ in his Transition? To 
Rule of Law? Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 117–160. In this sense the doctrine of the “invisible constitution” is 
a retrospective substitute justification, and is not a prospective product borne out of the 
progress demonstrated by the functioning of the Constitutional Court; and this is exactly 
why the practice of relying on these virtual rules quickly died off as soon as the 
Constitutional Court disassociated itself from the ambitions of its first, founding president, 
and thus distanced itself from the concept that its primary role would be to expand the 
constitution in a latent but active manner, yet without appropriate mandate. Consequently, 
the claim that this “invisible constitution” too is part of the “hierarchy of the sources of the 
law”, as “a possible (and since held by the Constitutional Court: binding) interpretation of 
the Constitution” Jakab, A.: A magyar jogrendszer szerkezete [The structure of the Hungarian 
legal system]. Miskolc, 2005. 99–100 and <http://www.unimiskolc.hu/~wwwdeak/dolg_ 
ja.pdf>–is fundamentally misleading when observed from this perspective. 
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only serves up examples, from the outset foregoing the expectation of exhaustive 
comprehensiveness. (It can only be explained as an example of our human 
fallibility that when acting, we believe our response to be comprehensively 
completed, while its completeness is merely a given, dependent on whatever 
we have in our imagination about normality, about what we expect to occur 
and therefore whatever we deem ought to be subject to regulation.9) To put it 
differently, it is of an open texture, since–as stated earlier, when discussing 
culture10–it carries the potential that “it could have been otherwise as well”, 
even if it happens not yet or already not to become something else. By the same 
token, however–and this is the other pole of the dogmatics’ dual nature–at any 
given time it claims to be finite and final (self-closing) in its given state, as if–
although probably it may reopen the very next day–it were to live on unchanged 
forever as the very stuff of eternity. 
 Finally, there is yet another factor in the systemicity of legal dogmatics. 
Namely, even its relative permanence is just a matter of reconstruction, a 
function of the chosen perspective. Perhaps one may find fixed structural 
points in a system carrying the promise of remaining unchanged over time only 
provided that we identify the root of permanence in its logical nature, as a 
systemic axiom. However, once–just as with theologies constructed on revela-
tions, which are the models for the doctrinal study of law11–we start searching 
for decoding, understanding, or giving meaning(s) behind the authoritativity 
imposed by the holy text (the dogmatics of which, although, still may appear 
in a logically constructed conceptualized form, nevertheless, already in a 
hermeneutic context, thus, all in all, in the culturally predetermined duality 
comprised by the historical permanence of the physical nature of its signs and 
  
 9 As methodic precursor of the American “Law and Literature” movement, White, J. 
B.: The Legal Imagination Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression. Boston–
Toronto, 1973. 986. was only to reinvent the quasi ontological significance of “legal 
imagination”, which had already represented–for Schmitt, C.: Gesetz und Urteil. Berlin, 
1912. 129–the genuine borderline (never either improved or surpassed by Kelsen) within 
which juridicity might at all be conceived. Cf., by the author: ‘Change of Paradigms in 
Legal Reconstruction (Carl Schmitt and the Temptation to Finally Reach a Synthesis)’ in 
Wahlgren, P. (ed.): Perspectives on Jurisprudence Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup. 
Stockholm, 2005. [= Scandinavian Studies in Law 48]. 517–529 and Rivista internazionale di 
Filosofia del Diritto. LXXXI (2004) 691–707. 
 10 Karácsony, A.: A jog mint kulturális jelenség [Law as a cultural phenomenon]. 
Jogelméleti Szemle, 2002/4 <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/karacsony11.html>. 
 11 Cf., e.g., Kraft, J.: Über das methodische Verhältnis der Jurisprudenz zur Theologie. 
Revue internationale de la théorie du droit 3 (1928–29) 52–56 and On the Methodical 
Relationship between Jurisprudence and Theology. Law and Critique 4 (1993) 117–123. 
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the historically bound and self-fixingly varying nature of their meanings),12 we 
must recognize that we are faced with a progressive chain of development. 
This is merely to recapture the world of the acting man which he had previously 
positioned in the past to be beyond his personal sphere of influence–of course 
without having more or a different influence over the end result of the process 
(due to having been elevated to being the subject from the position of being 
just a mere reference), than the amount he had previously believed (at least 
according to his subjective perception) to have had. 
 However, if in fact every newly evolved state of the law does indeed 
(theoratically speaking) reorganize the doctrinal study of law–i.e. if law and its 
doctrinal study are in constant interaction and are therefore moving following a 
wave-like pattern with relation to one another, and thus constantly providing 
each other with new impetuses–, it can also be supposed that legal policy has 
a similar relationship of accompaniment with dogmatics. This is so because the 
latter is not an independent acting factor: it only demonstrates the extent and 
direction to which law in action is established, planned, harmonized, and co-
ordinated in either legislation or the application of law.13 Well, even in this 
respect the doctrinal study of law does not herald creative novelty, neither does 
it exhibit an independent character, since all the while the effort to render the 
conceptual base and systemic potentialities as uniform and coherent as possible 
still happens in this very same sphere and is taking place in this context. 
 
 
3. Ideality v. Practicality in Legal Systemicity 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider, what is the exact status of those 
sets of meanings which are suggested by those kinds of differentiations, 
according to which–for example–“the thinking governing the doctrinal study 
of law is limited not by rules of positive law as ‘dogmas’, rather by those 
  
 12 Cf., by the author: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures of Law 
in Moreso, J. J. (ed.): Legal Theory / Teoría del derecho Legal Positivism and Conceptual 
Analysis / Postivismo jurídico y análisis conceptual: Proceedings of the 22nd IVR World 
Congress Granada, 2005, I, Stuttgart, 2007. 181–193 [ARSP Beiheft 106] and in 
<http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/PDF%20files/IA/IA%20-%20Hungary.pdf> as well as 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 177–197 and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/ 
f4q29175h0174r11/fulltext.pdf>. 
 13 Cf., by the author: ‘Towards an Autonomous Legal Policy?’ [abstract] in [23rd World 
IVR Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy] Law and Legal Cultures in the 
21st Century: Diversity and Unity Working Groups Abstracts. Kraków, 2007. 111 and 
<www.law.uj.edu.pl/ivr2007/Abstracts_WG.pdf>. 
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background category sets which may have affected the shaping of these rules 
in the process of their formation”.14 I guess the very heart of this matter is that 
on an analytical level we first distinguish two different kinds of intellectual 
representations and subsequently we discern an effect/result-type primacy, or 
temporal priority between them. 
 If we understand something, this understanding can only stem from the 
fact that we already possess the ability to intellectually conquer the subject of 
our theoretical investigation by the means of categorization and classification, 
i.e. by way of comparing it to something already decoded and thereby subjected to 
relative identification and differentiation. Or, on the one hand we have the 
intellectual facultas to do processing, and on the other we are in possession of 
the results of prior processing (as experimentum). Consequently, we have 
already a certain degree of routinized (and to a great extent also confirmed) 
practice, following which this comparatio can be carried out sufficiently. It 
would, however, not be meaningful to identify either pole or section as an 
absolute starting point, thereby attributing primacy or priority to any of them,15 
since–as far as it can at all be meaningful to establish such differentiation 
once a given degree of complexity has been reached–we cannot think more 
of the process than one developing in native reciprocity and necessary 
complementarity, becoming increasingly more complex in its potential. There-
fore, there is no factor that would prevent the linguistic manifestation of such 
‘background category sets’ to–coincidentally–correspond exactly to the way 
those ‘rules of positive law’ are posited verbally. At the same time it is obvious 
that any act of drafting new regulation rests on an existing doctrinal assumption, 
and in most cases it will carry the potential of integration of the new 
(conceptually split or divided) doctrinal relations into the systemic structure of 
the existing scheme. 
 There are always theoretical possibilities, but the law does not and cannot 
have an idealistically perfect, finished, and closed system, due to the fact that 
law itself is practical action, a response given to particular challenges, and 
thereby a model creation achieved by way of normatively ascribing prospective 
targets to retrospective fundaments. When the wise men of early modern times 
were contemplating the comprehensive description of the world in terms of 
natural laws, they could posit the presumptive existence of a “mathematical 
  
 14 Szabó: Ars Iuris… ob. cit. 155 [the emphasis is by Cs. V.]. 
 15 In contrast with the view of Hayek, F. A.: The Primacy of the Abstract [1968] in his 
New Studies In Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London–Henley, 
1978. 35–49, attributing primacy to the ability of abstraction–versus concrete observation–
in his debating on cognition. 
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value” within the system as something that would necessarily follow from their 
having comprehensively discovered the nature of economic processes. However, 
as they quickly recognized it as well, no large degree of comprehension is 
realistic, due to the ever changing disposition of the infinite number of players 
and further relevant factors involved, which is to render the system too complex 
for the human faculties of comprehension to have a sufficient match.16 While 
they did in fact accept the task of trying to realize some sort of an ideal, yet 
they also accepted the foreseeably inevitable defeat in their effort to directly 
realize it. Therefore, although we may indeed have ideals, but only ones that 
are necessarily bound as constrained by the presence of finite objectives and 
surrounded by adequate practical conditions. For we can hardly do more at any 
given instance than gravitate toward the next challenge in trying to meet it, thus 
attempting to give meaning to our presence here on this planet. 
 
 
4. Conceptualization, Systematization, Dogmatization 
 
The Roman law’s reception sprouting mostly from Italian seeds and spreading 
over the course of centuries led to the development of two fundamentals on 
the European continent, and the tracing of the ideal of ius back to lex was to 
implicitly contain both. 
 First and foremost, whatever the legislator has posited constitutes law itself, 
comprehensively, exhaustively, and with exclusivity. This is the common 
mental core relied on originally when the European doctrine on the sources of 
law started to develop, in terms of which the legislative act of positing a law 
is to be treated as the source of the law. In ontic terms, for the continental 
tradition law is manifested with and by this; and from a gnoseological 
perspective this provides the starting point for all inquiries into law. It is in 
this that the idea exclusive to the Continental law’s applicatio iuris is born: 
law is something artificially established as physically perceptible, objectified, 
discreetly separate entity, valid on its own, which, when applied, is transformed 
to be of utility for a derivative product prepared by the judge for adjudicating–
as a synthetic construct–on a statement of fact.17 This being in vivid contrast 
  
 16 Or, all this complexity is cognizable only for God–as opinioned both by Molina, L. de: 
De iustitia et iure. Cuenca, 1593 and Lugo, J. de: Disputationum de iustitia et iure. Lyon, 
1642. See Hayek: The Primacy of the Abstract… op. cit. 28, note 5. 
 17 It follows directly form this that the concept of Tatbestand [the statement of those 
facts that constitute a case in law] has been included in the conceptual set of Continental 
law–and only of Continental law–with due cause in due time. The so-called conclusion of 
264 CSABA VARGA 
  
with the Anglo-Saxon model, which (in contrast with the late republican and 
imperial periods) having derived inspiration from Roman models older still, is 
only capable of capturing the presence of law in the case-by-case actualization 
of the ideal of justice through the judge’s decision itself, “declaring” the search 
to find a posteriori the dikaion–the most fitting, fair and just resolution in the 
given individual situation–to have culminated in attainment. 
 Secondly, the continental tradition perceives in law a message that has already 
reached a certain level of generality, a set of experiences of prior decisions which 
have been captured in the form of regolas, which–if objectified–can govern, 
make uniform, and guide into preestablishedly foreseeable and predictable 
channels any procedure carried out in the name of the law. Accordingly, law is 
a pattern of future decisions formulated in generality. All this in contrast 
with the Anglo-Saxon perception, which does not discern more in what is 
manifested as law than a particular case-specific and exemplary manifestation, 
which–if we or anyone else were to have perceived the case at hand differently 
from the way the presiding judge saw it–just as well could have been different. 
Thus, continental Rechtssetzung always constructs against the force of some 
sort of vacuum, because wherever création du droit enters with legis latio, 
there law appears in place of what had previously been empty space–all this in 
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon mentality, where even the feasible professionali-
zation of law-making and its conversion into industrial-scale production does 
not result in any completion of “the law” (with senses of finality, roundedness 
or fulfillment), rather at best it only exemplifies: it merely sheds (recalls, 
manifests) an exemplary and rather commendable light on a smaller portion of 
what is presumed to have ever existed as law behind it, through the occasional 
judicial act of eventually naming it.18 
 The conceptualization of law–that is, the elaboration and treatment of 
linguistic elements describing legal relations in sets of concepts as components 
                                                      
fact is a product of legal dogmatics: a logically constructed complementary pair of the 
norm concept, which allows the schematization mounted on a syllogistic conclusion–set 
off from the act of Rechtssetzung [création du droit, etc.]–in the operation called 
Rechtsanwendung [application du droit, etc.]. 
 18 For instance, according to Oliver Wendell Holmes, generalization means reduction. 
On his turn, Justice BRANDEIS had concluded therefrom that “The process of inclusion and 
exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with its first enunciation. The 
rule as announced must be tentative. For the many and varying facts to which it will be 
applied cannot be foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law.” 
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236. Cf. also Cardozo, B. N.: Law and 
Literature [1925] in his Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses. New York, 
1931. 8 and 15. 
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of logically erected constructs, organized into some coherently arranged overall 
set to build up its systemicity–will be achieved in such an understanding of the 
law as exhaustively embodied by its posited generality, and as the outcome of 
mental operations with texts of the law itself in its reconstruction at a meta-
level which is intellectually erected upon it. Well, the doctrinal study of law 
can be characterized as system of interrelations mentally deconstructed from 
the primary manifestations of the law, that is, as a secondary meta-level 
fortified by its own comprehensive systemic construct built upon the primary 
text core.19 It follows directly therefrom that legal dogmatics only formed, 
could have formed, and does in fact form where the law manifests itself in 
form of textual objectification; consequently all procedures carried out in the 
name of law have to be based on formal linguistic-logical operations of text-
processing. Wherever the current ideal of law and order spreads beyond the 
mere (formal) quality of text-conformity–either due simply to the actual lack 
of such textuality (as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition), or because the text, in 
addition to its own self-referential finality, sets the prerequisite additional 
requirement of a personal ethical conviction in sync with or directed at the 
fulfilment of given values, sourced from the transcendental power having 
revealed the text itself (as in classic Jewish or Islamic law)20–, there is (and can 
be) no legal dogmatics. The thought of legal dogmatics is simply alien to the 
ordo-ideal and operational principles of such classicm non-systemic arrange-
ments. As the Common Law has for long established it, guidance derived from 
relatable precedents (properly speaking, from their judicial evaluation) is 
dependent on the singularity of particular cases; and the model cases used as 
examples for referencing represent a set of unrelated unique circumstances, 
among which nothing would necessarily tie them together in a formal way, so 
there is no logical connection between them either.21 (Characteristically enough, it 
was the English approach to logic–as opposed to its German understanding–
which made it obvious that logic itself is not the study of entities, occurrences, 
or any other capacities taken in their by chance aggregate, rather it is the 
inquiry into relations that are said to prevail exclusively within the one same 
system amongst its theorized elements, accepted as potentially arguable as proven 
  
 19 Cf. Pokol, B.: Jogbölcseleti vizsgálódások [Legal-philosophical inquiries]. Budapest, 
1998. 44. 
 20 Cf. Varga: Legal Traditions? op. cit. passim. 
 21 Ibid. 
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or valid in order to test their infrasystemic coherence, i.e. consequentiality to 
the exclusion of latent contradictions.22) 
 This is why the doctrinal study of law is a characteristically continental 
product of Middle Ages and early Modern Times in Europe. It formed as a 
result of how, starting from 15th century Bologna, our ancestors received Roman 
law according to the contemporaneous scientific ideal and the consequentialism 
in their order-ideal. This essentially axiomatic ideal of order following the 
methodology of geometry and mathematics was continuously cultivated for 
centuries, leading to the formation of such a solid secondary tear in scientific 
analytical work (providing the law with a self-referential framework for 
interpretation) built around (and above) the actual primary tear of the law, 
which in the early Modern Times, when the law codification of nation-states 
(as an act of reestablishing national unity) was done with an attempt to link 
specifically the law, as well as its application and scholarly processing, back 
to the exegesis of those posited codes of national laws. Well, at that time juris-
prudence itself was proposed for a model of dogmatics, Begriffsjurisprudenz or 
conceptual jurisprudence, containing both its own genesis and actual self-
realization within itself as in a sort of “conceptual heaven” [Begriffshimmel], 
complete and sufficient in and of itself. The building of its conceptual 
framework is done by a new branch of scholarship: Rechtslehre, which if 
(and when) having reached whatever level of systemic self-formulation was 
attainable, can then naturally go on to attempt to do an investigation into the 
branches as well.23 
  
 22 Cf., by the author: Az ellentmondás természete [The nature of contradictions, 1989]. 
In his Útkeresés. Kísérletek – kéziratban [Searching for a path: unpublished essays]. Buda-
pest, 2001. 138–139. 
 23 The concept of Rechts|lehre is derivative of iuris|prudentia, presuming transforma-
tion by scholars, whereby law, the conceptual phenomenon, turns into scholarship, with a 
concept-set created according to some scientific ideal. On its turn, the doctrinal study of 
law is derivative of the law posited: it is meta-order thereof. 
 Scholarship disposes of its own procedure of verification/falsification, freed of inter-
ventions. In contrast, the doctrinal study of law is parasitic a form. As a higher level 
reformulation of the law with implements of logic and the requirements of systemization, it 
takes into account the law’s contexture as well, and as a reflex-phenomenon in a meta-
reconstruction of the law, it is reformulated continuously in harmony with all finite 
(mentally fixed) states of the law. 
 If it is true that by one fell stroke of the legislator’s pen, whole libraries are vulnerable 
to be rendered out-of-date [as formulated by von Kirchmann. J. H. in his Die Wertlosigkeit 
der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft. Heidelberg, 1848 striking the peak of legal positivism: 
„Drei Worte des Gesetzgebers, und ganze Bibliotheken werden zur Makulatur”]–as recently 
happened with Quebec’s Code civil, when shortly after its enormous doctrinal processing 
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 We need not simply reiterate that wherever law is posited in a continental 
sense, this involves the parallel birth and reciprocal coexistence of its doctrinal 
study, but moreover we need to point as far as claiming that in our arrange-
ments dogmatics provides the interpretive context of and for the law posited. 
By the way, this automatically renders the question illogical whether or not 
dogmatics itself may have any mandatory force. Obviously, it has none. Yet 
one still may not step forward with radically new legal understandings in hope 
of success, expecting far more than flat rejection. (Our life follows this tradition. 
Its understanding and following in practice secure our life the necessary bounds–
like river banks hold the flow of water–; even our freedom is contextualized by 
it, directing our actions into ready-made or self-reforming channels. In contrast 
with the Anglo-Saxon mentality, which guarantees the sense of constancy in an 
ever-evolving world, without any superstructure erected. In law, the latter 
rather achieves consistency directly, by way of relying on the cross-referential 
use of judicial discourse in argumentation and justification.) 
 
 Moreover, although it is one single given corpus of the laws upon which a 
dogmatics is elevated, doctrinal studies continuously develop in time with 
competing strands (directions or variations) according to authors. In choosing 
amongst concurrent variants one may naturally use whatever criteria (including 
the one used to rank scientific explanations), the final criterion is however always 
provided by willful decision within the canon of institutional discipline,24 
harmonizing restitutive conservatism and the renewal’s practical intents. 
 
 
                                                      
had finally been completed spanning a period of some 150 years [Brierley, J.-E. C.–
Macdonald, R. A. (ed.): Quebec Civil Law. Toronto, 1993. 728], it rapidly became 
obsolete with the enactment of a new code replacing it–, then this can only target legal 
dogmatics, even if cultivated under the aegis of and by means of scholarship, just as this 
mostly happened with countries (in the 19th century exegetic nations-centered upswing) that 
had already completed their law codification process. 
 24 For instance, the disciplinary entitlements of the Teaching Church, including the 
option to declare anyone a heretic and the institution of censorship as well; or, in a special 
area of law, those preference-orders that are non-official but are definitely to be taken into 
consideration, and which are to function in both basic examinations and higher level court 
procedures in countries rich in literature comprised of competing works in the doctrinal 
study of law (especially Germany). 
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5. Rules and Principles in Law 
 
We spoke above of the manifestation of law being posited in general, because 
this is the pattern in continental Europe to become–slowly but systematically–
the foundation for law to be manifested as sets of rules. To be rule-based is 
one of the feasible directions of development, rather self-evident by the way, 
knowing, from the past, the developmental trends of scientia in general and of 
theologia in particular, knowing logical reasoning based on systemic conceptual 
constructs, and knowing how much idealized the use of axiomatic patterns was 
in history. 
 Being rule-based, however, has never been exclusive, although to this day 
it persistently remains the basic form of posited law. The circumstance that 
principle-based and individual equity-based methods of decision making appear 
to be competing directions in our time, is just a sign of tactics (in a historical 
context then: signaling the trend of daily battles) of a struggle for supremacy, 
i.e. how to achieve primacy; since it activates an already available potential 
in order to use it for constructing while de-constructing, according to those 
desiderata within its reach. Its elements had been known since the earliest of 
ancient times: reference to values, clauses marking community contents of common 
good and interest and public safety, adjudication according to consequence 
or derived from undefinedly flexible legal concepts. This new development 
working to loosen the positivity of law (as signaled by the worldwide effect of 
Dworkin25) is nevertheless almost completely irrelevant from the point of view 
of dogmatics. 
 Because as soon as law is fundamentally rule-based, even competing 
perspectives signal the existence of rules, or the presence of the mandate to 
apply given rules in given situations. Moreover, even the integration of such 
competing perspectives into the underlying system is mostly mediated by the 
construction of critical gaps of rules–only to develop their own mediatory 
forms, from being case-specific (and therefore incidental and feeble) to 
gradually becoming defined as quasi-rules themselves. Consequently, even the 
logic behind their dogmatics has no other target than to advance their own 
genuine or quasi rule-set to a higher developmental level in this way (Rule Set1 
converted into Rule Set2, and thereby creating a construct valid for use in 
whatever given present time). Or, all their verbal attacking or mode of 
phrasing aims to form a canon diversifying Rule Set2 from Rule Set1, but in the 
  
 25 See in particular Dworkin, R. M.: Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political 
Philosophy. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 1–37. 
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perspective of some Rule Setx (the targeted–albeit always temporary–result of 
such tactical procedures). 
 Accordingly, the dogmatics of current mainstreams is exactly neither of a 
new type nor one offering alternatives. It is perhaps its radical style reminiscent 
of battle alarm that makes it at first glance unusual (just as the truly brutal ad 
hominem arguments of Engels or Lenin26 did not change philosophizing at 
their time, at most they signaled its instrumentalised use as an available tool of 
class-struggle). Since it remains a common element that in law the termini of 
decisions are eventually determined by the law itself–even if the law does not 
define anything further in specification. Unless–in terms of procedural options–
it turns to the alternative of appointing an outside forum of arbitration, it 
does not even turn over the territory to other materialities (homogeneities) 
contrasted to its own “distinctively legal”27 one. Even its potentially undefined 
nature is no other than that of the determined undetermined [bestimmte 
Unbestimmtheit] described by Lukács,28 the filling with content of which on the 
terrain of law is given as an exclusive power to the judge appointed to the 
case, and paired with appropriate discretion. Therefore, without the false 
construct of some mechanicity, we cannot even claim a chance that “a legal 
regulation would be filled with content by non-legal rules of another social 
sphere”.29 
 
 
6. Correlation between Legal Cultures and Legal Theories 
 
Our experiences have grown exponentially in the past half century, and 
especially in the last quarter century. Our theoretical legal thinking has by now 
gone away beyond the boundaries of the previously deeply entrenched posi-
tivist legal thought, and now–founded by the philosophy and methodology of 
sciences, substantiated by comparative historical, anthropological and sociological 
investigations, enhanced in problem-sensitivity, with a particular emphasis 
given on differentiation between separation and concurrence of ontological 
and epistemological aspects–it is ready to fully understand what it could 
already perceive in germs (of more intuition and hesitation than of scientific 
  
 26 Cf. Szabó, S.: A lenini stílus a gyakorlatban [Practice of the Leninist style]. Korunk, 
1960. 375–382. 
 27 Cf. Selznick, Ph.: The Sociology of Law. In: Sills, D. L. (ed.): International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 9. New York, 1968. 51 et seq. 
 28 Lukács, G.: Ästhetik I. Berlin, 1963. 720. 
 29 Pokol, B.: Jogelmélet [Legal theory]. Budapest, 2005. 31. 
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categoricity) in the literary products of the debate between formalism and anti-
formalism back in the 1960’s.30 
 An internal reorganization has occurred among the modes of legal reasoning 
and argumentation in the process of competing for the position of getting 
accepted as canon, so that the ruling of the law’s territory could be reallocated 
via the reassignment of leading positions. In order for this to happen, new legal 
policies, ideals and ideologies, as well as professional world views (in the 
sense of juristische Weltbilden) were formulated, which can, naturally, one day 
in the future end up consolidating into (temporarily come to a rest as) a new 
legal world view, which will be a new balance, establishing a new professional 
deontology, replacing (or, to be sure, at least sublating) past normativism.31 
 What is constantly implied by the above is the outcome that the chances 
of a theoretical-methodological reconsideration (once formulated by Chaïm 
Perelman and Michel Villey upon the stand of anti-formalism in argumentation) 
are steadily growing and so does the chance of reaching a more complex answer 
in hermeneutics. A new element is the English–American consciousness, which 
for the first time in history responds to the call to investigate the feasible 
connections among law, language, and logic; and in its haste to quickly come 
to possess this construct and in the midst of its focus on wanting to rule over 
the practical development of law, it has started systematic efforts at integrating 
into its working legal system a mass of new methodological options. While its 
law is “floating” and practically disappears into a mist,32 its legal professionals 
have been put in the position of a gladiator and are left to rely solely on the 
awareness of the solid methodical nature of their procedures. 
 Our globalization has caused our theories to converge, yet our law has failed 
to follow suit. The excitingly complex methodology which is crusted onto 
the core of a still remarkably non-conceptualized English–American legal 
corpus of a merely denotative function has slowly started to dissolve the body 
of Continental law, which has for centuries been extremely conceptualized 
and enclosed by the walls of an axiomatic systemic discipline. And what is an 
unusual cultural intermixture and interflow produced by a comedy of errors 
  
 30 For an overview, cf. Horovitz, J.: Law and Logic. A Critical Account of Legal 
Argument. New York–Wien, 1972. 213. 
 31 Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 
and What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around the 
Topic of ‘The Judicial Establishment of Facts’. In: Atienza, M.–Pattaro, E.–Schulte, M.–
Topornin, B.–Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift 
für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003. 657–676. 
 32 Cf. Varga: Legal Traditions? op. cit. passim. 
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from a comparatist’s perspective observing from a point far off in the distance, 
is in this very context a remarkably likable and almost ideal study target for a 
thinker using cognitive mechanisms geared toward a methodic and paradigmatic 
reconstructive approach. All this is now given added importance–beyond the 
currently forming global-village dimension–by the issue of the convergence 
trend, present within the increasingly homogenized legal domains currently 
fought for in our unifying Europe, with former diverging traditions turned into 
interaction between Civil Law and Common Law, as observed in part in their 
daily interfacing and in part in their common foundations, their functioning 
and increasingly more conscious cultivation, on common platforms, fora and 
discourses. 
 
 
7. Theoretical and Socio-philosophical Perspectives 
 
It appears that the understanding reached in the Hegelian “cunning of reason”33 
(which suspects both a conscious and an unaware force at work in the shaping 
of the world, expressed by the Marxian paradox in that “they do not know it 
but they do it”34) has been serving as one of the explanatory principles of the 
development of science. 
 We know from linguistics that specialized languages making use of jargons 
even on the most homogenized fields are rooted in general language usage, and 
wherever they reach a boundary they borrow from the latter. Despite the 
theoretical universality and self-sufficient validity of its logical-mathematical 
toolset, the effort to construct the pure and unified language of science has 
failed.35 As mentioned already,36 linguistically speaking law is law, not 
reducible to anything other, so it cannot be substituted with any other statement 
concerning the law. Consequently, anything built on the law is at a meta-level 
in relation to it. But as also concluded then, parallel to the law (that can be 
referenced with ultimate validity) three further law-related homogeneities are 
built on everyday heterogeneity through complicated and uninterruptible 
(inseparable) interrelations as to their respective languages: 
  
 33 “List of Vernunft” in Hegel, G. W. F.: Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Section II 
(2), § 36 in <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history3.htm#036>. 
 34 “Sie wissen es nicht, aber sie tun es” in Marx, K.: Das Kapital I in Marx & Engels 
Werke. 23. 88. 
 35 See, e.g., ‘Frege, G.’ in <http://plato,stanford.edu/entries/frege/> and the reference to 
unified science in note 4. 
 36 Wróblewski: op. cit. 
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ordinary language 
 
language of law language of the practice of law 
 
language of the doctrinal study of law language of the science of law 
 
ordinary language 
 
 Relative to the law, the practice of law is at a meta-level similarly to how it 
works in validity references, while it is also an ascertainable fact that the 
authoritative practicing of the law is capable of overwriting that what it claims 
only to apply. The doctrinal study of law is in a similar position, and the 
science of law–so to speak–observes all this from a distance. All of these four 
components, on the one hand, exert effects on one another, while on the other 
hand, all they are floating in the medium of ordinary language as stimulating it 
and stimulated by it at the same time. 
 Well, if it is true that on the foundation stretching from ordinary language 
to the language of jurisprudence there are four, partly and relatively separated 
(because constantly self-rehomogenizing) levels of meta-systems, then–even 
if this is valid only for an intellectual reconstruction in language-based 
symbolization–this allows the suggestion of some sorts of differing “modes of 
existence” of the legal phenomenon with “socio-ontological differences” as 
systemic counterparts.37 
 I have long entertained the thought of proposing the existence of competing 
components of law.38 And voilá, here we are faced with the law’s intimidating 
complexity, hardly supportable social weight, and the total web of inter-
mediaries39 of being legally disciplined and socially standardized, which are 
continuously reproduced and managed by largely separated blocks in the sector 
  
 37 E.g., Schulz-Schaeffer, I.: Rechtsdogmatik als Gegenstand der Rechtssoziologie. 
Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 25 (2004) 141–174–recognizes (p. 141) that “Established 
rules of interpreting the codified law have their part in constituting the social reality of 
law–provided that they are observed by the courts.” 
 38 Cf., by the author: Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold Pospíšil and the 
Comparative Study of Legal Cultures. In: Law in East and West On the Occasion of the 
30th Anniversary of the Institute of Comparative Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, 1988. 
265–285 and ‘Law’, or ‘More or Less Legal’? Acta Juridica Hungarica, 34 (1992) 139–
146 as well as his Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. op. cit., para. 6.1. For 
another attempt, see Pokol, B.: The Concept of Law. The Multi-layered Legal System. 
Budapest, 2001. 152. 
 39 ‘Vermittlung’ in George Lukács’ posthumous The Ontology of Social Being. Cf., 
from the author: The Place of Law in Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985. 193, 
especially para. 5.1.3, 107 et seq. 
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assigned to law by the division of labor within society. Well, some keenly exact 
sensitive conclusions40 resulting from considerations just surfaced allow the 
possibility for the law’s socio-ontology to further develop its foundations, 
known from Lukács and Niklas Luhmann, among others. 
 What are exactly legal professionals doing in a complex society when 
receiving a large heap of texts in order to be used as a basis of referencing in 
their practical decision making? What kind of understanding legal professionals 
form when with firmly established doctrinal understanding in the background, 
they define meanings able to be presented as premises of decisions made 
according to their particular hierarchy-expectations and practical testing? 
 It is to be known that sectors separated (though working together) in the 
social division of labor while also separated from one another (though working 
together) are to produce and incessantly reproduce a framework of under-
standing, which despite forming from the incidentals of everyday practice, 
nevertheless is to reflect determinations manifest in it, creating such a web 
which is although not independent of all active forces in the given sphere but 
as a concentrate of them it too steps forward as an intermediary medium, and 
as such will to a great extent become independent of all the particular 
definitions. Furthermore, it will step forward as such a factor–a second reality–
produced by man based on hierarchical structures originally imbedded in 
reality, which has a distinct chance to effectively direct the law’s understand-
ing into its proper artificial channels and preestablished groupings. And this 
way–making use of fundamentally educational and socialization-generating 
instruments–it can finally manufacture a certain practical sense of human 
security (in all sectors being disciplined and standardized) out of something 
that had in and of itself ever been a silent sign: out of language used by law, 
out of the way language conveys law in given forms. 
 Or, so far we have talked about dogmatics as the contextualizing grouping 
of the further definition of the intellectual environment of one possible determina-
tion of legal mediation, which is positivation. Thus we have contemplated the 
  
 40 To quote but one example: “all particular areas of action (practices) have a correlative 
verbal activity attached, through which an efficiently practice-oriented communication can 
take place among participants. The key to this is the conceptual set of language rendering 
the interrelation prevailing between signs and meanings in language to accord to mental 
correlations corresponding to those modes of action which are relevant to the said practice. 
In this very sense all social practices have such a conceptual system which may quite 
reasonably be termed dogmatics.” Bódig, M.: Jogdogmatika és jogtudomány [Legal 
dogmatics and legal science] and A jogdogmatika tág és szűk fogalma [The large and 
narrow notions of legal dogmatics]. In Szabó, M. (ed.): Jogdogmatika és jogelmélet [Legal 
dogmatics and legal theory]. Miskolc, 2007. 32–33, respectively 255–256. 
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issue from a single perspective, on the path of the chances of the formally 
posited law’s further formalization. Therefore we must be cognizant that when 
doing so, we are giving preference to analytical requirements, and are quite a 
long distance away from gaining an understanding of the law’s social aspects, 
of the nature of its truly sociological existence, and even farther away from 
being able to get insight into law’s mystery in its true complexity. 
 What really takes place here is hardly other than us projecting, distanced by 
materializing (as alienated into reified objectivities)–and thereby transferring 
into the fetishized role of a pseudo-deity or substitute sense of security–that 
which is in fact us ourselves. Instead of the autopoietic reliability of human 
practice self-reproducing at a societal level, we transpose our desire for safety 
into conceptualized constructs, into logic and taxonomy, and with this ultimately, 
in a metaphysical dimension. Thereby we can hardly go beyond what has 
already been described by Frank as a psychoanalytical projection,41 fulfilling 
the needs of our most human and therefore quite ineradicable innate atavism 
that will transpose our want for authority in a father complex into the en-
chantment by artificial creatures we are stressed at incessantly and instantly 
producing. This, even if considered in the sense of scientific reconstruction to 
be the demystification of an idol, is at the same time, however–and exactly in its 
own duality42–a necessity. This is exactly the reason why law was at all formed, 
since exactly such and similar kinds of reasons led to humanity constructing 
so called second nature to surround itself with, exemplified, among others, by 
doctrines.43 
 
 
 
  
 41 Cf. Frank, J.: Law and the Modern Mind. New York, 1963. 404. 
 42 Referring here to the deeply socio-philosophical debates regarding what the role and 
the genuine ontological status of ideologies are. 
 43 A research carried out thanks to and within the Project K62382 financed by the 
Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. 
